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Abstract
This paper presents a systematic mapping study on the model-driven
engineering of safety and security concerns in systems. Integrated model-
ing and development of both safety and security concerns is an emerging
field of research. Our mapping study provides an overview of the current
state-of-the-art in this field. Through a rigorous and systematic process,
this study carefully selected 95 publications out of 17,927 relevant pa-
pers published between 1992 and 2018. This paper then proposes and
answers several relevant research questions about frequently used meth-
ods, development stages where these concerns are typically investigated
in, or application domains. Additionally, we identify the community’s
preference for publication venues and trends.
1 Introduction
The notion of (functional) safety is defined as a freedom from risk of damage
to user, property or environment, and correct operation of a system in response
to its inputs. Security, on the other hand, is the prevention of illegal access
causing change and destruction of equipment, information and services [11].
Traditionally, depending upon the domain and the background, software engi-
neers mostly focused on designing systems, which are either safe or secure in
nature. Typically, we find methods that investigate these concerns separately.
While some exchange of ideas existed across these concerns, modern systems
require their thorough, combined treatment since security concerns may affect
safety and vice versa. This is particularly true for Cyber-Physical Systems or
Internet of Things, whose components may be interconnected via the Internet
and, hence, there is a good chance for safety concerns to be exposed and thus
vulnerable to other types of failures caused by security attacks. Connected (and
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consequently exposed) safety systems must, therefore, be equipped with security
mechanisms for protection against such attacks. Only recently, there has been
a surge in research focusing on integrated modeling and development of safety
and security systems [11, 113].
Model-driven engineering [85] is a development paradigm that focuses on cre-
ating models, which could be systematically transformed into (correct) pieces of
software. The advantage is that developers can exclusively focus on modeling
the problem rather than worrying about unnecessary and distracting imple-
mentation details. In that regards, model-driven engineering is appealing for
addressing safety and security concerns where models play the integral role in
describing and analyzing them.
Systematic mapping studies are meant to provide an overview of a research
area through classification and counting contributions in relation to the cate-
gories of that classification. They involve searching the available literature in
order to know what topics have been covered and where the corresponding pa-
pers have been published [71]. According to Kitchenham et al. [46], the research
questions in mapping studies are general as they aim to discover research trends
(e.g., publication trends over time and topics covered in the literature). This is
in contrast to systematic reviews, which intend to aggregate evidence and hence
formulate a very specific goal (e.g., whether research results are practical and
deployable for industry) [72]. The outcome of a mapping study is an inventory
of publications on the selected topic mapped to a classification [108].
In this paper, we present a systematic mapping study on model-driven en-
gineering of safety and security systems. The overall aim of this study is to
collect relevant state-of-the-art in this field of research. Besides that, we answer
some important questions like what are frequently used methods and tools in
this field, what are their applicable development stages, and in which applica-
tion domains they have been evaluated. We also identify where the community
prefers to publish research results and what are recent publication trends in this
field. We prudently select 95 publications out of 17,927 relevant search results
through a rigorous and systematic process. These publications were proven very
helpful in answering a set of six judiciously crafted research questions, providing
gainful insights, and identifying the directions for future research.
The paper is organized as following: Sec. 2 details the systematic mapping
process including the research questions we investigate in this study. Sec. 3
presents results of the mapping study. Sec. 4 presents our analysis on the
current state-of-the-art. Sec. 5 discusses the threats to validity of this study
and the adopted mitigation strategies. The paper is concluded in Sec. 6.
2 Mapping study process
Time period We scope the time period of related studies published from 1992
to 2018. The earliest paper we could find in our mapping study was published
in 1992, hence the starting time. We started this mapping study in December
2018, hence the ending time. Please note that we re-conducted the search in
January 2019 in order to make sure that all results published until 2018 are
included in our study.
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Digital libraries Four digital libraries were used in this mapping study:
ACM1, IEEE2, Springer3, and Web of Science4. According to [23], these digital
libraries are among the most popular sources in computer science and engi-
neering that ensure a high coverage of potentially-relevant studies. Although
Scopus5 is also considered as an important source, it was not included in the
study as it is not accessible in our institution. However, many venues indexed
by Scopus are indexed by other included digital libraries as well. We did not
include Google Scholar6 in our mapping study as the search results of Google
Scholar tend to be repetitive with respect to results from the included digital
libraries, and its unique contribution to the search process is unclear [23].
Tool Conducting a systematic mapping study is a tedious and time consuming
task. It usually involves search, collection, filtration, and classification of a huge
amount of papers. Without a helping tool, this is a very difficult endeavor.
In this work, we used Zotero [1] and spreadsheets. These tools helped us in
importing, organizing, and analyzing search results.
2.1 Research questions
The goal of this mapping study (following the guidelines presented in [45, 71, 72])
is to discover what is the current state-of-the-art in the field of model-driven
engineering of safety and security systems (and how it can be advanced in the
future). This goal leads to following precise research questions (RQs):
• RQ1: At which development stage the research was conducted?
Rationale: Model-driven engineering is a multi-stage development process.
We want to know at which development stage this research was conducted.
This information can help us identify which development stages are sus-
ceptible to be focused more for the engineering of such systems.
• RQ2: Which methods and tools were employed during the research?
Rationale: The use of methods and tools is inevitable during any research
and development activity. This information can help us identify what are
frequently used methods and tools for the engineering of such systems.
• RQ3: What is the classification of the contribution of the research?
Rationale: Through this question, we want to investigate what is the con-
tribution type of articles. According to Wieringa et al. [108], contribution
types refer to determining the type of intervention being studied. This
could be a process, method, model, tool, framework, etc.
• RQ4: In which domain(s) research results were evaluated?
Rationale: Safety and security systems may belong to various application
domains, e.g., railways, nuclear plants, and marine systems. By answering
this question, we want to know what are the application domains in which
the research results were evaluated. This information can help us identify
1https://dl.acm.org
2https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/home.jsp
3https://link.springer.com
4https://apps.webofknowledge.com
5https://www.scopus.com
6https://scholar.google.com
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Figure 1: Steps for the search and selection process
which application domains have gained more interest of developers of such
systems.
• RQ5: Where the research was published?
Rationale: By answering this question, we want to find out whether
researchers preferred to publish in journals, magazines, conferences, or
workshops? Usually journals include more mature and concrete results,
whereas conferences and workshops are targeted for timely discussion and
early feedback. By answering this question, we can find out the maturity
of results of this field.
• RQ6: What is the research publication time-line and trend?
Rationale: Time-lines and publication trends tell us about novelty and
frequency of research. By answering this question, we can find out how
the community is building around this topic. Is the topic a relatively
new one, gaining popularity in recent years, or just phasing out? This
information can help us determine the potential of this research topic.
2.2 Papers search and screening
The mapping study was conducted in 6 steps as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Step 1 - Search in digital libraries The following query performed in afore-
mentioned digital libraries produced 17,927 search results. Digital library-wise
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Table 1: Digital library-wise results distribution
Digital library URL # of results
ACM dl.acm.org 193
IEEE Xplore ieeexplore.ieee.org 238
Springer link.springer.com 17,383
Web of Science apps.webofknowledge.com 113
Total 17,927
acquired results are shown in Tab. 1.
(“model-driven” OR “model-based”) AND (“engineering” OR “development”)
AND (“safety” OR “safe”) AND (“security” OR “secure”)
The search terms were identified according to the study topic. Similar to
Kitchenam et al. [45], we adopted the PICO (Population, Intervention, Com-
parison, Outcomes) criteria to formulate the search terms.
• Population: According to Kitchenam et al. [45], population may refer to
a specific software engineering role, a category of software engineers, an
application area, or an industry group. In our case, population is the
terms about “safety/safe” and “security/secure”.
• Intervention: According to Kitchenam et al. [45], intervention may re-
fer to a software methodology, a tool, a technology, or a procedure. In
the context of this study, intervention includes terms “model-driven” or
“model-based”.
• Comparison: The comparison part is not applicable in this mapping study
because this mapping study does not involve the comparison of model-
driven and other types of approaches.
• Outcomes: Outcomes include the terms relevant to “engineering” or “de-
velopment” activities.
We used the Boolean operator OR to join alternate words and synonyms in
each part (i.e., population, intervention, outcomes), and the Boolean operator
AND to join the terms from the three parts, respectively.
Step 2 - Inclusion and exclusion of results In order to make the study
selection results objective, we defined selection criteria that were employed in
the study selection process. The criteria is as following:
Inclusion criteria:
• Peer-reviewed studies published in conferences, workshops, journals, mag-
azines or books,
• Studies classified as computer science publications, and
• Studies published in the English language.
Exclusion criteria:
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• Studies published as courses or reference work entries,
• Studies published in disciplines other than computer science,
• Studies published in languages other than English, and
• Studies presenting non-peer-reviewed results or gray literature.
In ACM and Web of Science digital libraries, the search process was simple.
The basic search fields were enough to run the query, which required no further
processing at this point. In the IEEE digital library, we had to use the advance
search option. We wrote the query in the command search and obtained the
results. The IEEE digital library also included courses on this topic in search
results, which we excluded. We only included conferences, journals, magazines
and early access articles. As shown in Tab. 1, the Springer digital library pro-
duced the maximum amount of results. In order to focus on relevant results,
we included only computer science publications, publications that were writ-
ten in the English language, and publications that appeared as book chapters,
conference papers or journal articles. We also excluded reference work entries
from research results. This brought down the overall result count from 17,927
to 6,159 papers.
Step 3 - Meta-data lookup In this step, we carefully checked the available
meta-data, e.g., keywords and abstracts, of results. We filtered out all those
results, which were not explicitly focusing on safety and security. This brought
down our results tally to 596.
Step 4 - Manual title search Despite the meta-data lookup, some publi-
cations could still be included in results, which are only remotely dealing with
safety and security concerns. In order to ensure that the final result only includes
high-quality relevant papers, we manually checked the title of each paper. We
ensured that each paper title has something to do with both safety and security.
As a result of this step, our result count became 44.
Step 5 - Check for duplicate results Once we individually checked results
produced by each digital library, we merged all of them into a single repository.
Since many digital libraries index same venues, the search results may be re-
dundant. In order to have a list of only unique results, in this step we check the
list of merged results for duplicates. All duplicates were consequently removed
from the list of results and the publication count became 37.
Step 6 - Snowballing In this last step, we performed snowballing readings.
In a snowballing reading, the lists of references of found papers are used to
identify other relevant studies [110]. We performed the backward snowballing,
i.e., we went through lists of references of previously obtained papers and iden-
tified the potential relevant studies. For each paper identified for the possible
inclusion, we applied the same criteria that were employed for the selection of
papers in the first place. Then, we identified 58 further relevant studies in this
step. After this, the final set of results reached the tally of 95 publications.
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2.3 Studies classification scheme
The classification scheme used for this study follows a systematic process sug-
gested by Petersen et al. [71, 72]. We are using keywords as bases for studies
classification. Initially, we read abstracts in order to find representative key-
words and concepts. The set of extracted keywords from different studies are
then unified in order to overview the nature and contribution of the research
(e.g., as shown in Fig. 3, different similar methods and tools are merged into
a single category). This results into a set of categories which is representa-
tive of the underlying population. Sometimes meaningful keywords could not
be extracted from the abstract alone. In such cases, either introduction and
conclusion sections were studied, or complete papers were skimmed through.
Upon selection of the final set of keywords, they are clustered and consequently
used to form the categories. Where applicable, classifications were also based
on the Software Engineering Body of Knowledge (SWEBOK)7 structure (e.g.,
as shown in Fig. 2, which are the main life-cycle activities of software engineer-
ing) or inspired from previous categorizations (e.g., as shown in Fig. 4, which is
based on the work of Wieringa et al. [108]).
In order to reduce any bias, we followed an iterative strategy. Initially, the
first author classified all studies. The classifications were then reviewed by the
second author and corrected, where necessary. In case of a disagreement, the
third author independently reviewed the classification and gave his judgment.
The opinion of majority prevailed. Although all authors of this paper are se-
nior and experienced researchers, given the fact that this step involves human
judgment, the threat of bias cannot be completely eradicated.
2.4 Data extraction and synthesis
To answer the RQs, we extracted specific data from selected publications. Tab. 2
describes data items that have been extracted in this mapping study.
Data synthesis targets to synthesize the extracted data to answer the RQs.
The results of this task are discussed (also visually) in the following section.
3 Mapping study results
In this section, we synthesize the extracted data to answer previously listed
RQs.
3.1 Development stages (RQ1)
As shown in Fig. 2, only a few studies (4 out of 95) were covering the whole
model-driven engineering spectrum, i.e., all development stages. Hassan et
al. [36] were discussing the idea that how the Formal Analysis and Design for En-
gineering Security (FADES) approach can be used to support the model-based
software engineering paradigm. Bloomfield et al. [13] use the structured safety
cases approach to discuss the impact that security might have on an existing
safety case. Apvrille et al. [4] presented a similar idea based on the SysML-Sec
environment covering all the development stages. However, all these studies
7https://www.computer.org/education/bodies-of-knowledge/software-engineering
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Table 2: Extracted research items
Item name Description Relevant
RQ
Development
stage
At which development
stage was the approach
applicable?
RQ1
Method/tool What is the deployed
method or tool?
RQ2
Contribution
classification
What is the classification
of contribution of the pub-
lication?
RQ3
Application
domain
Which application domain
the study was applied to?
RQ4
Publication
type
In which publication type
was the study published?
RQ5a
Publication
venue
In which venue was the
study published?
RQ5b
Publication
year
In which year was the
study published?
RQ6
did not use any application domain to evaluate the proposed approaches. The
approach presented in [9], on the other hand, discussed the design and devel-
opment of a smart card application management infrastructure by specifying
business and technological processes and associated security requirements.
Although the planning phase is very crucial for successful development of a
system, very few studies (2 out of 95) have focused on this stage. In the first
study, Park et al. [67] discuss how multi-agent systems and swarm intelligence
can be exploited to boost counter-terrorism and public safety activities. In
the second study, Park et al. [67] emphasize the idea of using cybersecurity
considerations to make nuclear facilities even safer.
As anticipated, most of the studies (33 out of 95) were focusing at the level
of requirements. 14 [30, 29, 64, 78, 99, 73, 3, 65, 5, 38, 103, 102, 20, 77] out of
those 33 were focusing exclusively on requirements modeling of such systems.
16 studies [31, 61, 62, 80, 27, 48, 10, 17, 55, 100, 76, 70, 107, 69, 104, 84] were
focusing on both requirements modeling and analysis. A few studies were either
focusing solely on requirements analysis [75, 83] or requirements traceability [43].
The architecture and design stage is of paramount importance in the devel-
opment of any system; safety and security systems are no exceptions. 28 out of
95 studies were focusing on this stage. 4 out of those studies [106, 35, 19, 105]
were discussing architecture modeling. 10 studies [109, 79, 96, 51, 89, 114, 24,
56, 88, 98] were discussing architecture analysis. 14 studies [34, 41, 8, 115, 116,
18, 52, 22, 26, 87, 57, 37, 2, 32] were discussing how to make architectural design
of systems both safe and secure through modeling and analysis.
Testing also plays a pivotal role in systems development life-cycle. We found
3 studies focusing on testing in our mapping study. While Sojka et al. [95] were
explicitly focusing on the testing of safety and security requirements within the
automotive domain, Shahir et al. [92, 91] were focusing on test case generation
for safety and security of marine systems.
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Figure 2: RQ1: Studies classification based on development stages
Development stages, such as implementation [47, 7], and deployment and
reconfiguration [101], were also mentioned in the literature, however, they were
not the center of attention of researchers of this field.
A large amount of studies (22 out of 95) were not focusing on any devel-
opment stage at all. They were either comparing safety and security concepts,
e.g., [21], discussing how one can help achieving the other, e.g., [15], making sim-
ilarities and dissimilarities explicit between the two, e.g., [12], analyzing how the
two concepts can cross-fertilize each other, e.g., [74], etc.
3.2 Methods and tools (RQ2)
Fig. 3 graphically depicts the frequency of the applied methods and tools. Some
approaches consisted of more than one method/tool. The methods whose use
has been confined to only one study are being skipped here for the sake of
brevity.
Our research shows that a multitude of methods and tools are being used in
this field but none clearly stands out. Although there is an observable tendency
among the community to use formal methods for such kind of engineering activ-
ities (23 studies are conducted using formal methods), yet no particular formal
method can be classified as the method of choice. Among more frequently used
formal methods, the use of Abstract State Machines has been found in five
studies [35, 34, 41, 92, 91], whereas the use of Event-B [103, 107, 104] and Al-
loy [17, 19, 18] has been mentioned in three studies apiece. However, please note
that all applications of Abstract State Machines and Event-B method stemmed
from single groups and targeted towards marine and industrial control systems,
respectively.
The second most widely used set of techniques, after formal methods, was
based on STAMP and its variants, i.e., STPA, STPA-Sec, and STPA-SafeSec
(7 studies). Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) [54]
is an accident causality model based on systems theory and systems thinking.
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Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [40] is a powerful hazard analy-
sis technique based on STAMP. STPA-Sec [116] is a system-theoretic process
analysis method explicitly focusing on security issues. STPA-SafeSec [32] is an
analysis methodology for both safety and security. The use of STAMP is men-
tioned in [103]. The use of STPA is mentioned in [70]. The use of STPA-Sec is
mentioned in [115, 116, 87]. The use of STPA-SafeSec is mentioned in [32].
The use of UML and its variants, i.e., SysML and SysML-Sec is also relatively
popular in this domain and has been found in 5 studies. The use of Unified
Modeling Language (UML) is mentioned in [80]. The use of Systems Modeling
Language (SysML) has been mentioned in [65]. The use of SysML-Sec (an
extended version of the SysML language to design safe and secure embedded
systems) has been found in [5, 83, 4] .
Another approach relatively popular in this domain is based on Goal Struc-
turing Notation (GSN) and safety cases. The use of these notations has been
found in 4 studies. The use of GSN is mentioned in [79, 102, 57] and the use of
safety cases is mentioned in [13, 102].
Goal-oriented requirements engineering approaches, such as KAOS or NFR,
also play an important role in this domain. Their use has been found in 4
studies. The use of Knowledge Acquisition in Automated Specification (KAOS)
– a goal-oriented requirements engineering approach – has been found in [76,
77]. The use of the Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) approach – a goal-
oriented technique that can be applied to determine the extent to which specific
objectives are achieved by a design – has been found in [48, 98].
Failure analysis is the process of collecting and analyzing data to determine
the cause of a possible failure in a system. Failure analysis methods (e.g.,
FMEA, FMVEA, and FTA) are also commonly used in the engineering of safe
and secure systems. Their use has been found in 4 studies. The use of Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is mentioned in [109]. The use of Failure
Mode, Vulnerabilities and Effects Analysis (FMVEA) – a variant of FMEA – has
been found in [89, 88]. The use of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has been found
in [96]. An approach very similar to failure analysis is hazard analysis (e.g.,
HAZOP and CHASSIS). The use of hazard analysis approaches has been found
in 3 studies, however, 2 of them were applied in combination with traditional
failure analysis methods. The use of Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
in combination with FMEA is found in [109] and in combination with Combined
Harm Assessment of Safety and Security for Information Systems (CHASSIS)
has been found in [43]. The use of CHASSIS in combination with FMVEA has
been found in [88].
Some researchers have also proposed different patterns in this domain, i.e.,
architectural safety patterns including security considerations [79], safe & sec
case patterns [100], and systems engineering patterns for interlinking safety and
security [2].
There are many other methods and tools which have been used less fre-
quently as compared to the aforementioned methods and tools. Following are
the methods whose use has been found in 2 studies apiece. The use of AltaRica –
a high-level language designed for the modeling of systems – has been mentioned
in [10, 18]. The use of Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) – a graph-
ical representation for specifying business processes – has been found in [61, 62].
The use of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) has been found in [78, 66]. The use of
Simulink – a graphical programming environment for modeling, simulating and
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Figure 3: RQ2: Studies classification based on applied methods and tools
analyzing multi-domain dynamical systems – has been found in [101, 84]. The
use of the Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of
Service (DoS), Elevation of Privilege (EoP) (STRIDE) approach – a structured
way to find security threats – has been found in [79, 56].
A large number of found studies (25) did not employ any particular method
or tool in the conducted research. They were either characterizing the differ-
ences between safety and security, e.g., [21], comparing the two approaches [81],
stressing the need of their integration, e.g., [29], or demonstrating how they
could possibly complement each other, e.g., [15].
3.3 Contribution classification (RQ3)
As shown in Fig. 4, the contribution of a study can be classified into multiple
categories. Most of the researchers were interested in deploying model-driven
approaches for risk-related activities of safe and secure systems. 21 out of 95
studies focused on this aspect. While majority of researchers explicitly focused
on risk analysis [109, 6, 115, 18, 19, 51, 89, 116, 56, 88, 52, 87, 57, 32], some
also focused on risk assessment [13, 43, 24], risk communication [33], risk man-
agement [114, 37], and risk modeling [84].
20 out of 95 publications [78, 73, 48, 96, 10, 17, 95, 63, 22, 76, 103, 67, 98, 102,
70, 107, 20, 77, 104, 101] proposed an approach or a methodology based on an
already existing method or tool. Their aim was to adapt an existing technology
in such a way that it becomes exploitable for model-driven engineering of safety
and security systems.
17 out of 95 studies belonged to the assorted class. We put those studies in
this class which could not be classified otherwise. Most of these studies were
either comparative or conceptual, i.e., some of them were comparing safety
and security concepts, e.g., [21], some of them were eliciting similarities and
dissimilarities between the two concepts, e.g., [12], some of them were arguing
why the two concepts are vital for Cyber-Physical Systems and Internet of
11
Figure 4: RQ3: Studies classification based on contributions
things, e.g., [112], some of them were aligning the two concepts with each other,
e.g., [93], etc.
10 out of 95 studies presented a framework, which could be useful in vari-
ous phases of model-driven engineering of safety and security systems. These
frameworks were based on either formal methods [99, 8, 27, 55], SysML [65], or
other various methods and tools [106, 75, 66, 86, 9].
9 out of 95 studies presented a model. The model could either be related
to the collaborative modeling of safety and security properties [82], a life-cycle
model [64, 47, 42], a process model [29, 80], a reference model [69], or a business
process model [61, 62] for the development of safety and security systems.
8 out of 95 studies presented a language for the model-driven engineering
of safety and security systems. The proposed languages were either formal
languages [36, 31, 26], graphical modeling languages [5, 83, 4], programming
languages [7], or a language for presenting mishaps [97].
Some researchers also presented some decision support systems [35, 34, 41,
92, 91], patterns [79, 100, 2], and policies [3, 105] for the model-driven engineer-
ing of safety and security systems.
3.4 Evaluation domains (RQ4)
Fig. 5 graphically depicts the frequency of evaluation domains. Some publica-
tions used more than one domain for evaluation purposes. Domains confined to
only one study are being skipped here for the sake of brevity.
Researchers dealing with safety and security were mostly interested in evalu-
ating their proposed methodologies and tools in the automotive domain. 18 [96,
89, 95, 82, 5, 56, 83, 86, 88, 76, 87, 90, 2, 57, 20, 39, 93, 84] studies were applied
to automotive systems.
After automotive systems, researchers of this field were mostly interested in
applying their methods and tools in control systems. 13 studies were applied to
control systems. Control systems included general-purpose control systems [115,
12
Figure 5: RQ4: Studies classification based on evaluation domains
47], air traffic control systems [29, 80, 43], access control systems [3], industrial
control systems [65, 53, 52, 103, 105, 107], and network control systems [104].
After control systems, avionics and railway domains were most attractive
for researchers of this topic. Both domains were used as a testbed in 6 studies
apiece. The avionics domain has been featured in [8, 10, 18, 19, 63, 70]. Whereas,
the railway domain has been featured in [109, 27, 38, 68, 69, 77].
The use of marine systems as an evaluation domain has been mentioned in
5 studies [35, 34, 41, 92, 91]. However, an interesting point to note is that all of
these publications stemmed from a single group applying a particular method:
Abstract State Machines.
Automation and pipeline systems were mentioned in 4 studies each. Automa-
tion systems were further classified into building automation systems [64, 99],
electrical substation automation systems [79], and industrial automation sys-
tems [33]. Pipeline systems, on the other hand, were mainly dealing with the
oil industry [48, 51, 55, 98].
Business, medical, nuclear, and power grid systems have been used as an
evaluation domain in 3 publications each. The use of business systems, mainly
enterprise resource planning systems, has been mentioned in [31, 61, 62]. The
use of medical systems has been mentioned in [106, 8, 114]. The use of nuclear
systems has been mentioned in [75, 24, 67]. The use of power grid systems has
been mentioned in [75, 32, 101].
The use of defense [26], fire detection [17], rescue [66], road transporta-
tion [22], smart card [9], and virtual organization [78] systems has been men-
tioned only once in the found literature.
As aforementioned in Sec. 3.2, many found studies did not employ any par-
ticular method or tool in their research. These studies were either characterizing
the differences between safety and security or stressing the need of their integra-
tion. Naturally, such comparative or road-map studies were not always subject
to evaluation. Consequently, a large number of studies (23) we found were not
evaluated on any particular domain.
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Figure 6: RQ5a: Studies classification based on publication types
3.5 Publication types and venues (RQ5)
Publication types (RQ5a) In this study, only peer-reviewed publications
(including books, journals, magazines, conferences and workshops) were consid-
ered. Fig. 6 provides an overview of the distribution of studies between these
venues. An overwhelming majority of studies (64/95) were published in confer-
ences followed by journals and workshops, respectively.
Publication venues (RQ5b) Looking at mapping study results, it was clear
which venues were mostly targeted by researchers of this domain. The top
seven venues for this domain are shown in Fig 7. The most favorite venue of
researchers of this topic is undoubtedly the Conference on Computer Safety,
Reliability, and Security (Safecomp). 21 [29, 109, 10, 19, 33, 51, 89, 114, 56, 26,
86, 100, 76, 87, 103, 2, 57, 70, 39, 93, 104] out of 95 studies are published on this
venue. Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) [34, 41, 92],
Proceedings of the IEEE [8, 112, 101], and Journal on Reliability Engineering &
Systems Safety [6, 74, 53] contained 3 publications each. Conference on Critical
Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS) [105, 25], Journal on Security
Informatics [66, 91], and Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient Sys-
tems (SERENE) [13, 107] hosted 2 papers apiece. All other venues had only 1
publication each.
3.6 Publication time-line and trend (RQ6)
Fig. 8 shows the time-line and trend of publications in this area. As per our
findings, the first study explicitly focusing on safety and security together was
published in 1992 [21]. While the interest in this area was moderately increasing
until 2011, a significant increase can be observed in 2012 onwards reaching its top
in 2015. Since then, like a typical hype cycle, the community is perhaps slowly
climbing the “slope of enlightenment” towards the “plateau of productivity”.
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Figure 7: RQ5b: Studies classification based on top publication venues
Nonetheless, the increase in the number of publications indicates that the area
is considered highly relevant by the software engineering research community.
4 Discussion
Regarding RQ1, we have found that majority of researchers are working at the
level of requirements or architecture. Modeling and analysis activities are the
primary focus at both these levels. Only few researchers are considering the
whole model-driven engineering spectrum (i.e., all development life-cycle activ-
ities). While modeling and analysis of requirements and designs are important
activities, it is also imperative to ensure that these models are eventually trans-
lated into implementations as seamlessly as possible. Detailed works showing
such transformations are currently missing from the state-of-the-art and worth
exploring in the future. Another important point we have observed in found
studies is that testing is not a primary focus of researchers of this field. Although
the code generated through a rigorous development process is, in principle, al-
ready verified and validated, this is not enough in case of critical systems. For
such systems, the generated code also needs to be tested [14]. In our opinion,
researchers of this field should also give priority to testing as it uncovers differ-
ent set of problems than those found in earlier stages of development, e.g., if the
code is later manually modified in order to introduce further implementation
details, the designer can use tests in order to check that no faults are introduced
inadvertently.
Regarding RQ2, we have found out that no single method or tool is prevalent
in this domain. Although the use of formal approaches is common (which, by the
way, makes perfect sense given the critical nature of safety and security systems),
no particular formal method stands out. Formal methods, such as Abstract
State Machines or Event-B, have been used in design and development of many
systems. However, the use of these methods often stems from particular groups.
The use of the STAMP method – originally proposed for the safety domain –
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Figure 8: RQ6: Studies classification based on publication time-line and trend
also looks promising in this field and several variants of STAMP have recently
been proposed to extend its capability towards security systems. However, it
needs to be applied to more domains and projects before its actual suitability for
safety and security systems can be truly evaluated. Additionally, the current
use of this method is also confined to modeling and analysis of requirements
and design artifacts. In the future, application of this method (by extension) to
other stages of development could be an interesting topic of research. The use
of graphical modeling languages, such as UML or SysML, is certainly lacking
behind in this field. Even the applied work is mostly concentrated on modeling
and analysis of requirements. Given the potential of these languages, there
could be a niche for their users to demonstrate their effectiveness through their
widespread applications to safety and security systems.
Regarding RQ3, we have found out that most researchers were interested in
risk analysis of such systems. Risk analysis is a crucial activity in the domain of
safety. This becomes even more crucial when safety is integrated with security.
Variety of methods were used for risk analysis and mostly researchers worked
at the architecture and design level. While hazard analysis (e.g., HAZOP) and
failure analysis (e.g., FMEA or FTA) are already established methods for risk
analysis, new approaches, such as FMVEA, STPA-SafeSec or SAHARA, are
also emerging recently. Working towards maturity and improvement of these
approaches by their further application to new domains and projects is also
an exciting research topic. Another interesting observation we made was that
most researchers are extending the capabilities of existing methods and tools
to solve the challenges of this field (e.g., FMVEA is based on well-established
FMEA or STPA-SafeSec is based on popular STPA) rather than presenting
new frameworks and languages. Of course, new pertinent frameworks (e.g.,
SAFESCALE [106]) or languages (e.g., FADES [36]) are also surfacing, but
relatively low in number.
Regarding RQ4, we have found out that most researchers used the auto-
motive domain to evaluate their results. This is consistent with the emerging
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phenomenon of autonomous driving where both safety and security play equally
critical roles. However, the prominence of research in model-driven engineering
for the automotive domain predates autonomous driving and has more to do
with the adoption of this paradigm by the automotive industry [16]. Control
systems were also a favorite testbed for the evaluation of such systems.
Regarding RQ5, we have found out that most researchers preferred to pub-
lish their results in conferences and especially in SAFECOMP (International
Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security). Articles appearing
in journals were not only less in numbers but also distributed among different
venues. The numbers indicate that this research field is still (relatively) young
and evolving.
Regarding RQ6, we have found out that the interest of community is in-
creasing in this research field. In past few years, more and more publications
are appearing explicitly focusing on the model-driven engineering of safety and
security systems.
We have observed in our research that a significant amount of publications
did not mention any development stage, method, or evaluation domain in their
results. This is mainly due to the fact that these publications were stressing
the need of joint modeling and development of safety and security by either
comparing the two concepts, discussing how one can help achieving the other,
or analyzing how the two concepts can cross-fertilize each other. Naturally, such
conceptual and road-map studies were not subject to classification in respective
RQs.
In the end, we would like to express that, in our opinion, state-based for-
mal methods8 supporting the “correct-by-construction” development approach
seem to be quite suitable for engineering of such kind of systems: they cover
all stages of development life-cycle, variety of modeling and analysis tools are
available at the disposal of developers, quality assurance is embedded within the
development process, there is a support for translation of requirements and de-
sign artifacts into correct pieces of software, etc. The catch is that state-based
formal models may be opaque, i.e., hard to read and write for many stake-
holders [49, 50]. In this case, such developments can be augmented by using
graphical modeling notations such as UML or SysML. This not only provides
cross-fertilization among various modeling tools but also enables developers to
harness the true potential of each tool at the suitable development stage. Some
tools (e.g., UML-B [94]) and approaches (e.g., KAOS-Event-B [60]) already ex-
ist and worth exploring in this regard. As far as risk analysis is concerned,
which generally does not fall within the jurisdiction of formal methods, further
research is required towards its harmonization with formal methods such as
shown by Khan et al. [44]. Another problem with state-based formal methods
is that while they offer effective tools for verification and validation, the support
for automatic code generation is far from desirable [58]. These methods can,
in principle, generate code artifacts from models, however, the generated code
needs a lot of manual post processing. This may introduce some inconsistencies
or errors in code, which may, in turn, compromise the integrity of previously
applied rigorous quality assurance process. This also makes systems susceptible
to extensive testing, which is already a weak link in the development chain of
such systems. Hence, future methods for model-driven engineering of safety
8a primer on state-based formal methods is available in [59]
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and security systems need to offer better tools and methodologies, especially for
code generation and testing, respectively.
5 Threats to validity
There is always a threat of validity for such kind of research. We also face
a number of threats in our systematic mapping process, which we discuss as
following.
The first threat is related to research questions: are they the right kind of
questions we should be asking? To minimize this threat, we judiciously crafted
the questions in alignment with the overall aim of this work after having several
internal discussions. The final set of research questions indeed reflect the goals
of our work.
The second threat is related to the terms used in search queries. To mini-
mize this threat, we adopted the PICO (Population, Intervention, Comparison,
Outcomes) criteria [45] to formulate the search terms. The selected terms un-
equivocally represents the goals of our work. An associated issue corresponds to
the frequently used acronyms for model-based/driven engineering. Although the
query used did not explicitly include related acronyms, such as MDE (model-
driven engineering), MDD (model-driven development), or MBSE (model-based
software engineering), this would not result in missing relevant articles because
such information is usually available (or redundant) in meta-data, e.g., keywords
or index terms, hence accessible.
The third threat is regarding the source of the data. We used four digital
libraries as a primary source for this research. All selected digital libraries are
well known in the computer science discipline for including most relevant re-
sults [28]. Although Scopus is also considered as an important source, it was
not included in the study due to its inaccessibility at our research institute.
However, many venues indexed by Scopus are already indexed by other con-
sidered digital libraries. Additionally, Wohlin et al. [111] state that having a
larger set of papers is not necessarily better for mapping studies. The important
thing is that found studies are a good representation of the population, which
we ensured in this study by adopting a rigorous paper selection process.
The fourth threat is regarding the quality assessment. As found by Petersen
et al. [72], quality assessment is not common in mapping studies. This is also
consistent with suggestions of Kitchenham et al. [46], which state that quality
assessment is not essential for mapping studies as their overall aim is to give a
broad overview of the topic area. However, despite these observations, we have
adopted a rigorous process for inclusion/exclusion and classification of papers,
which ensures that only high-quality related papers are selected as primary
studies.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a systematic mapping study on model-driven
engineering of safety and security systems. Our mapping study provides an
overview of the current state-of-the-art in this field. Through a rigorous and
systematic process, this study carefully selected 95 publications out of 17,927
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relevant search results, which proved very helpful in answering the judiciously
crafted research questions like what are the frequently used methods and tools,
what are the applicable development stages, and what are the evaluation do-
mains. Additionally, we identified the community’s preference for publication
venues and publication trends. Based on analysis of selected studies, we indi-
cated several avenues for future research.
The current state-of-the-art provides effective support for modeling and anal-
ysis of requirements and design of safety and security systems. However, the
state-of-the-art needs to be advanced in order to offer better tools and method-
ologies especially for code generation and testing, respectively. Better integra-
tion of graphical modeling languages with conventional formal notations and
better harmonization of rigorous methods and risk analysis approaches will also
help in this regard. We also welcome more studies encapsulating the whole
spectrum of model-driven engineering applied to safety and security systems.
In the future, we want to extend this study by asking qualitative questions
like what is the maturity level of the presented contribution, how useful it is
for the given task, which impetuses are required as input, and whether the
contribution is applicable at the design time (static) or the runtime (dynamic).
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